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Abstract
Humans are a species endowed with considerable cognitive plasticity, exist-
ing in a malleable social environment. As a result, behavioral constraints
emerge, which ensure the smooth functioning of the whole. In order to enable
the negotiation of social contracts, individuals are under pressure to adopt
consistent behavioral track-records that instill trust in potential interaction
partners. This leads to the emergence of stable selves. The pressure towards
consistency facilitates the proliferation of normative relations. The arrival of
language intensifies this consistency-enhancing pressure on the individual,
as it opens up the cognitive domain as an additional target of pressurization.
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Norms are everywhere. They are entrenched in virtually every aspect of our
social, cultural and personal lives. They are the glue that holds our soci-
eties together. The are also the scaffold that supports our mental constructs.
Nonetheless, norms and normativity are elusive concepts that, like inten-
tionality, resists reduction to natural properties. Hume has famously argued
that prescriptive claims cannot be derived from descriptive ones. How then
can they be integrated into an evolutionary account, that places humans on
one trajectory with all other animals?
The following is not an attempt at a rigorous naturalization of normativity.
This has been pursued very elegantly by philosophers such as Ruth Millikan.
Rather I will spin a (hopefully plausible) evolutionary tale of how norms may
have originated. I will propose an adaptationist strategy for brains with in-
creasing plasticity to reap the fitness-enhancing benefits of ever more com-
plex social arrangements. In keeping with Don Ross, I conjecture that in
order to facilitate successful interactions, pressure will emerge towards the
formation of stable social creatures. Such stable creatures, so this story goes,
will be under constant pressure to present coherent patterns of behavior to
their environment. One possible result of this pressure is the emergence of
Dennettian narrated selves. Finally, the arrival of language will explode the






Norms are a phenomenon in the fabric of our world that stand in contrast
to the natural order of things. “In the Natural Order Things Happen: 1. In
accordance with laws, 2. That brook no disobedience” (Taylor 2005). The
natural world is a ‘law governed’ world that can be parameterized in purely
descriptive terms. In the normative order on the other hand, “Normative
laws/ principles/ rules/ standards etc. ‘govern’ what ought to happen, ob-
tain, be done” (Taylor 2005). Normative properties and relations are a step
removed from the natural structure of the world.
Norms pervade our world. A Queen is worth more than a Jack and eating
with your hands is rude. Similarly, ‘apple’ refers to the same object in the
world as ‘pomme’ or ‘Apfel’ does. Often the contents of the norms are largely
arbitrary. It would be a perfectly logical world in which Queens were inferior
to Jacks, using a fork were impolite and ‘apple’ and ‘pomme’ had as much in
common as ‘night’ and ‘day’. While the content may be arbitrary, this does not
mean that the fact that norms concerning these contents exist is arbitrary.
Norms are not descriptive, but prescriptive. For this reason, they cannot be
straightforwardly true or false. Furthermore, their relationships with the
world are not causal, but normative. This means they guide and govern
events, rather than affect them. They are thus often viewed more as rules
than as factual relationships. Andy Salter, for example, writes that,
“Norms are the rules, written and unwritten, implicit and ex-
plicit by which human behaviour has been governed since the for-
mation of social groups where two or more human agents have in-
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teracted. Norms are defined and created by members of a society
and affect the attitudes, actions and behavior of themselves and
other members of the society. A society, and the communities, cul-
tures or social groups within the society, is defined by these ‘shared
norms’ ” (Salter 2002).
According to Ronald Stamper,
“A norm is a generalised disposition to the world shared by
members of a community,” and “Norms reflect regularities in the
behaviour of members in an organisation, allowing them to coordi-
nate their actions.” Also, “Organised behaviour is norm-governed
behaviour.” Furthermore, norms are “like a field of force that makes
the members of the community tend to behave or think in a certain
way” (Stamper et al. 2000).
A subtle but important difference can be made out between the views of
Salter and Stamper. While Salter views norms as rules that are defined and
created by the members of a society, Stamper sees norms as shaping the orga-
nized structure of a community more implicitly and in ways that may not be
amenable to expression as rules. Nonetheless, both emphasize the necessary
social component of norms and the importance of norms for the identity of a
society.
Stamper et al. (2000) outlines four categories of social norms that have a
long-standing tradition in social psychology. These include:
Perceptual norms - This arguably most basic category comprises the ways in
which we cut up the world into the phenomena to which we attend. These
norms are basic, because they provide the elementary level at which we rep-
resent and manipulate regularity in the world.
“Natural kinds, such as an orange or a tree we can treat as cul-
turally or even biologically defined but scientific norms might be
invoked to sharpen our perceptions of them in marginal cases but
all norms have to appeal, ultimately, to commonsense, perceptual
norms” (Stamper et al. 2000, p. 22).
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Stamper looks to John Dewey in noting that “roughly speaking ... we can
identify the perceptual norms with the words we use as fences around the
pieces of “reality” that we need to hold and manipulate in our minds” (Stam-
per et al. 2000, p. 22).
Evaluative norms - While Stamper sees these norms as potentially more on-
tologically complex, he views them as more chronologically basic than per-
ceptual norms. These norms are responsible for how we evaluate our percep-
tions (Salter 2002). For instance, we may perceive the physical boundaries
of an object, such as an occupied table at a restaurant, yet evaluate a larger
boundary for it, its social boundary, which may cause us to circumnavigate it
more generously than physically necessary. Stamper hypothesizes that,
“We may begin to perceive boundaries that should affect our ex-
pectations or behaviour long before we begin to honour the interior
with a name: thus evaluative norms may claim to be the parents
of our perceptual norms,” (Stamper et al. 2000, p. 22).
Cognitive norms - These norms “tell us about structures and cause-and-effect
relationships,” (Stamper et al. 2000, p. 22). Since these give rise to common-
sense models of the world and guide our expectations of the occurrences of
events in the world, these norms can be seen as basis for what is sometimes
termed ‘folk science’. Of course, they are also the foundation for real science.
“Science is a massive system of explicit, high quality, cognitive
norms demarcated by the evaluative norms of the scientific com-
munity who determine which cognitive norms are to be regarded
as of scientific quality and which are not,” (Stamper et al. 2000, p.
22).
And finally:
Behavioral norms - This category comprises the norms most readily viewed
as such. They lend themselves to being expressed in prescriptive form, as
they “determine how agents should behave given certain conditions” (Salter
2002, p. 3). Behavioral norms range from explicit stipulations, such as not
touching exhibits in a museum and being quiet in a library, to more covert
understandings, such as not wearing red to a funeral and holding the elevator
for someone.
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While Stamper and Salter focus on norms that involve agents in social set-
tings, others have examined norms at a more elementary level, namely on the
level of so-called natural norms. Biological functions, such as the eye, can be
explained in (at least) two ways. Firstly, one can look at the physical-causal
structure of the eye and thus explain why it works the way it does. Alter-
natively, one can employ a teleological approach towards analyzing the eye,
appealing to functional concerns within the framework of natural selection.
Millikan’s teleosemantic theory, for instance, appeals to the selective history
of a property in determining its function (Millikan 1989a). This allows her
to consider natural norms in terms of the historical selective advantage they
have bestowed on the organism. For Millikan, norms need not be enforced by
an agent, rational or otherwise, but are validated with respect to the evolu-
tionary advantage they confer. Although natural norms cannot be translated
into or reduced to physical-causal descriptions, they are grounded in physical
processes, and generated by selection mechanisms (Cowley & MacDorman
2006). The norms of nature can be understood as “causal or structural capac-
ities that contribute to the exercise of some larger systematic capacity within
the larger systemic view” (Davies 2001). The functioning of the heart would
be an example—the natural norm of pumping blood ensures the higher-level
operation of blood circulation (Cowley & MacDorman 2006).
Social norms appear radically different from natural ones. They are shaped
through cultural pressures rather than natural selection and can be the sub-
ject of rational consideration. Nonetheless, just as Millikan and Fred Dretske,
amongst others, have attempted to construct theoretical frameworks for think-
ing about intentionality as a natural phenomenon, some philosophers are
working on construing naturalized accounts of normativity, which seek to
weave normative properties more or less strongly into the fabric of the natu-
ral/social order ((Barnes 1992), (Calvert-Minor n.d.), (Taylor 2005)).
While this dissertation is not concerned with a rigorous naturalization of
norms and normative force, it does seek to outline a logical adaptationist
trajectory for the arrival of full-blown (i.e. non-natural) norms on the human
proscenium.
CHAPTER 3
The Emergence of Plasticity
In the same way as the story of the descent of Homo sapiens unravels for a
long time before the eventual arrival of our species, so too do the origins of
normativity reach back far into pre-normative times. The world is a regu-
lar, deterministic place. Physical order provides the back bone for all activ-
ity on earth. Chemistry has engendered replicating molecules, which over
hundreds of millions of years combined to form RNA and eventually DNA
(Maynard Smith & Szathmáry 1998).
And against this nomological backdrop, the first simple creatures battle out
their genetically predisposed trajectories. Genes are continuously tested against
both the ecological niche and the composition of the gene pool in which they
find themselves. Specimens that harbor unsuccessful genes are weeded out.
This evolutionary pressure fosters phenotypes that are survival machines in
their ecological niches (Dawkins 1976). It is this pressure, this drive for sur-
vival, which has determined the behavior of creatures for millions of years.
If we are to find the roots of natural phenomena today, we may benefit from
searching for both enabling and limiting conditions in this primordial force
that ruthlessly sanctions or condemns behaviors.
The phenotype of a creature is composed not only of its physical characteris-
tics, but also entails its behavioral traits, which are prime targets for natural
selection (Dawkins 1976). The simplest creature conceivable exhibits behav-
ior that is entirely genetically determined. The dance of the honeybee for
instance is a prime example of a genetically determined, phenotypically hard-
wired behavior pattern that confers enormous adaptive advantage (Sherman
& Visscher 2002).
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A forager honeybee encodes the two-dimensional location and quality of a
food source in the movements she performs upon her return to the hive (von
Frisch 1967). However, this is not a meditated or willful action. She does
not decide to perform her dance. Rather, whether she dances or not—a bee
will not dance if the hive is empty—depends on complicated sensory triggers
executed be the receiving bees (Gould & Gould 1995). Thus, while the dancing
is not automatic upon arrival, it is similarly not “up to the bee”. It is an
evolutionary mechanism that has been finely honed over millions of years.
The form of the behavior exhibited in the honeybee is a function whose only
variables are the conditions of the environment and the composition of the
phenotype. Honeybees, as well as other insects, fall into the category of Dan
Dennett’s Darwinian machines (Dennett 1997).1Clark describes these as “the
simple, hard-wired variety, whose ecologically adjustable, survival-enhancing
responses are fixed by evolution” (Clark 2002d).
The next logical step is for evolution to introduce further variables into a
species’ behavior function. Dennett calls the specimens that exist at this
level Skinnerian machines (Dennett 1997). The behavior of the creature is
not completely genetically determined, but may vary with respect to events
that occur after conception and even after birth. In the Bay Area on the West
Coast of the United States, the White Crowned Sparrow displays dialects in
his song that vary with locality (Baker & Thompson 1985). The dialects are
specific to a certain group of birds and any fledgling born into that group will
learn it. Thus, there is plasticity in the organism, as the same bird could have
learnt any of a range of dialects had it been born elsewhere. This ontogenic
flexibility is an important step towards normativity, for when an organism
has ‘options’ of how to behave, normative properties can come into play.
Instead of a learning (and in addition to it) another way an organism can
‘influence’ its behavior is by altering its environment. This way it could max-
imize the stimuli it is exposed to that are advantageous for its survival and
minimize those that are detrimental. The pheromone trails left by ants for
instance, are an example from swarm intelligence that shows how potentially
precarious learning can be obviated by changing one’s environment in order
1There is actually debate about this. Not only has there been evidence that honeybees
are receptive of operant conditioning, but also that they possess relatively sophisticated cog-
nitive maps of their surroundings (Gould & Gould 1995).The example however is meant in
this instance only to illustrate the nature of Darwinian creatures and not to say anything
substantial about honeybess.
9
to bring it into alignment with one’s innately endowed cognitive capacities.
Dennett suggests the fitting notion of ‘tidying up’ for this phenomenon.
“Animals at all levels are designed to tidy up their immediate
environments, which are initially messy, confusing, intractable,
dangerous, inscrutable, hard to move around in. ... These are done
by “instinct”: automatized routines for improving the environment
of action, making a better fit between agent and world” (Dennett
2000).
This ‘instinctual’ rearrangement of one’s environment provides the soil for
an inchoate normative structure.2 As Clark has suggested (personal commu-
nication), there is a balance between engineering ourselves and engineering
our worlds, and both domains give rise to norms.
Dennett chose the Skinnerian moniker because creatures at this level can
be subject to stimulus and response type conditioning. The creature learns.
Dennett sees this as the simplest version of what he terms post-natal design
fixing (Dennett 1991, p. 184). Animals and their brains are available for
redesign, after confrontation with their environment.
There are some creatures however, that in addition to basic stimulus-response
type conditioning and evolutionary hardwiring possess a tool that is vastly
more fitness enhancing. “Such creatures exploit a kind of inner model of
their world, enabling them to try out moves in their imagination in advance
of committing their physical bodies to the act,” (Clark 2002d). Animals at this
level Dennett has coined Popperian creatures, due to Karl Popper’s elegant
description of certain cognitive abilities that permit “‘our hypotheses to die
in our stead”’ (Dennett 1997, p. 116). Creatures at this stage have some form
of receptive information, which can be manipulated in ways that are struc-
turally alike physically executed actions that manipulate objects in the real
world. As Dennett (1997) puts it, “an inner something-or-other structured in
such a way that the surrogate actions it favors are more often than not the
very actions the real world would also bless.”
2We humans are masters at altering our environment in ways that make it easier for us
to navigate our terrain (e.g. bus stops, post-it notes (to self), laying out our clothes the night
before, etc).
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Precisely what this something-or-other is, is not entirely clear. Dennett points
out that it need not be a representation. The stored information “has to be
in there in a form that can produce its premonitory effect when called upon
in an internal trial, but this effect can be achieved without constructing a
replica world” (Dennett 1997, p. 118). Rats can learn their way around a
maze without reward/punishment reinforcement. Subsequently, when a re-
ward is offered at the end of the maze, rats that have had experience of the
maze find the reward while others without such experience fail (Tolman &
Honzik 1930). This phenomenon is latent learning and creatures capable
of it are archetypical Popperian specimen, as they allow information they
have gained and stored about the real world to guide their actions towards
it. While the information the rats gain by ‘exploring’ the maze without be-
ing rewarded may be stored in forms very unlike explicit maps, these are at
least the precursors of representations, for they pave the way towards off-line
working.
While Popperian creatures are cognitively more developed than Skinnerian
ones and are adept at pre-selecting possible action plans by ‘taking into ac-
count’ the information they have acquired, they are still limited in the extent
to which they can manipulate their environment. What would be advanta-
geous at this stage (amongst other things, no doubt) would be the ability to
augment oneself through the introduction of artificial tools, thus making the
world a pragmatically and epistemically more survival-enhancing one. Or, as
Dennett puts it, being a creature “whose inner environments are informed
by the designed portions of the outer environment” (Dennett 1997, p. 131).
Creatures who have this ability are what Dennett calls Gregorian, after the
psychologist Richard Gregory, who investigated the role of designed artifacts
in the enhancement of intelligence (Dennett 1997, p. 131).
One (phylogenetically) early case of this ability is arguably the chimpanzee.
Wolfgang Köhler (1925) demonstrated memorably the skillfulness with which
his chimpanzees employed tools. He discusses behavior in chimpanzees that
not only seems to require the prior manipulation of an inner representation
or a model of the chimpanzee’s surroundings before the execution of a goal-
oriented action—as is typical of Popperian creatures—but also the capacity
of employing tools in a knowledgeable fashion, thus affecting not only its
environment, but also altering the cognitive workload of achieving its goal.
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“[A] chimp jumps fruitlessly at bananas that have been hung
out of reach. Usually, after a period of unsuccessful jumping, the
chimp apparently becomes angry or frustrated, walks away in seem-
ing disgust, pauses, then looks at the food in what might be a more
reflective way, then at the toys in the enclosure, then back at the
food, and then at the toys again. Finally the animal begins to use
the toys to get at the food.
[T]o all appearances, the chimps were solving the problem by
a kind of cognitive trial and error, as if they were experimenting
in their minds before manipulating the tools. The pattern of these
behaviors–failure, pause, looking at the potential tools, and then
the attempt–would seem to involve insight and planning”(Gould &
Gould 1994).
These reports, both written and filmed, have been widely criticized for their
failure to comment on the chimpanzees’ previous extensive exposure to the
boxes, sticks and toys, which they then used to reach the food. Recreation
attempts have shown that such exposure is essential for the ‘insightful’ be-
havior of the chimpanzees (Gould & Gould 1994). While Gould and Gould
accede that realizing that toys from play are useful in the attainment of a
physical goal may indeed be termed ‘insightful’,
“it represents a low-level, everyday sort of insight, and if we
take a hard line and require complete, from-the-ground-up novelty
before conceding conscious inspiration, then Kohler’s pioneering
work... does not provide much unambiguous evidence one way or
the other” (Gould & Gould 1994).
However, Gould and Gould agree that “by that standard few humans would
get passing marks for cognitive prowess” (Gould & Gould 1994).
Another way of approaching these findings is to relinquish the notion of ‘in-
sight’. One striking observation that surfaced in Köhler’s work was that while
a chimpanzee was capable of using the stick as a reaching tool whenever it
was present in the problem situation, the ape was unable to do so when the
stick was in another room out of his sight, even after he had just explored the
other room and the stick within it (Steedman 2002). What this points to is
that rather than being an explicit tool available to the cognitive machinery
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of the chimpanzee, the stick functions more like a Gibsonian ‘affordance’; ‘a
thing which affords reaching’ (Gibson 1966). “The affordances of the envi-
ronment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes” (Gibson
1986). “This... suggests that for non-linguistic animals, including those close
to us in evolutionary terms, access to the affordances of objects is tied to im-
mediate perception of the objects themselves” (Steedman 2002).
What this rules out, furthermore, is the ability to ‘backward chain’, i.e. to
‘work’ back to potentially useful elements in the past, which, as Steedman
(2002) notes, is
“quite a good way of running your planner. If you don’t have
much control over your physical environment, it is probably better
to look at those plans the situation affords, rather than backward
chaining to conditions that there may be no way for you to satisfy”.
This suggests that apes do not plan backwards from their desired end-states
(getting the bananas), but rather ‘forward chain’ from what the environment
affords until they’ve reached a satisfying outcome. After all, only apes that
experienced considerable exposure to the sticks and manipulated them ex-
tensively ‘hit upon the idea’ of using them as reaching tools (Gould & Gould
1994).
Another criticism of Köhler’s work was that rather than insightful behavior
on the chimpanzee’s part, some of the problem-solving solutions were due to
‘mere imitation’ either of other chimpanzees or of human keepers. Köhler
counters this objection by turning it on its head.
“ “Simple imitation!” I can only say to any who have not yet ex-
perimented with animals: when any animal suddenly does man-
age to imitate a performance enacted before it, of which it knew
nothing before, it inspires the greatest respect” (Köhler 1925, p.
232).
To be able to repeatedly exploit the tools one has stumbled upon is one thing;
to be able to exploit the cognitive fruits of a fellow primate demonstrates
the buds of cultural transmission. Dennett describes how some ‘cultures’ of
chimpanzees have hit upon a sophisticated way of exploiting termite holes as
a food source with the aid of sticks, other ‘cultures’ have not (Dennett 1997, p.
13
132). This cultural transmission of knowledge breathtakingly accelerates the
cognitive development, as innovations and cognitive achievements no longer
need to be translated into the genetic material via natural selection, but can
be passed down and across the generations non-genetically and culturally.
Why then is it that we don’t see chimpanzees building ever more elaborate
stick-tools to obtain ever more elusive rewards, but rather see them remain
stuck with their (relatively) primitive box-ladders and stick-reachers? As
mentioned earlier, Steedman (2002) suggests that it is the chimpanzee’s in-
ability of backward chaining, i.e. working from a goal backwards to the mea-
sures necessary to reach it, that immobilizes them at this stage of problem-
solving. It may be that for this sort of problem-solving one requires concepts
that permit propositional thought, which arguably cannot be achieved with-
out the concept-vehicling powers of language.3 This will be extensively dis-
cussed in Chapter 6.
Chimpanzees also cannot work at tasks together, due to their inability to
communicate, and thus cannot share the cognitive load of problem-solving.
Furthermore, chimpanzees cannot critically assess the cognitive procedures
that result in their tool-creation. Finally, chimpanzees are catapulted back
to square one, once the cultural transmission chain breaks, as they have no
way of immortalizing information or knowledge.
The relative crudeness of the chimpanzee’s cognitive abilities can be partially
traced back to their tools. Their tools enable mostly pragmatic rather than
epistemic actions (Cowley & MacDorman 2006). Successful chimpanzee be-
havior will get the ape physically closer to its goal. It is less likely however to
spawn and facilitate new cognitive inroads into the realm of problem-solving.
As humans, we excel at this. We have a rich intellectual history entirely de-
voted to solving problems which exist only because of this history. We have
3Perhaps the cognizer requires something like the predicates of ‘a reachy thing’ and ‘the
idea of an end-state (viz. of getting the bananas)’ for her to plan how to actually perform the
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Jim Hurford theorizes that pre-linguistic proto-concepts can enter into proto-propositions,
but seems reluctant to extend this to ‘proto-material-implication’ (Hurford 2006).
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created tools, which facilitate the creation of further tools and so on theoret-
ically ad infinitum. At the heart of this cognitive explosion, of course, is our
linguistic ability. As Dennett (1997) notes,
“among the preeminent tools are... mind tools: words. Skin-
nerian creatures ask themselves, “What do I do next?”... Poppe-
rian creatures make a big advance by asking themselves, “What
should I think about next?”... Gregorian creatures... [exploit] the
wisdom embodied in the mind tools that others have invented, im-
proved, and transmitted; thereby they learn how to think better
about what they should think about next.”
But before I discuss the full import of the cognitive functions of language in
humans, I will outline the elements of social coordination that factor into the
emergence of normative structure and the stabilization of the self.
CHAPTER 4
Social Coordination
At this point we should note a further trend that is applying its Darwinian
pressure to the species inhabiting our planet. This is the tendency towards
grouping into social arrangements. Organisms not only live in a particular
environment, they also exist with other members of their species, and other
species, in more or less complicated social structures. While there is no strict
correlation between the type of social arrangement and the extent of ontoge-
netic plasticity or cognitive level, à la Dennett, of a species, there are some
interesting trends.
Some of the most social arrangements are found amongst the Darwinian and
Skinnerian creatures. Eusociality, a social arrangement which is character-
ized by reproductive caste differentiation, cooperative brood care and over-
lapping generations (Gadagkar 1990) occurs primarily in insects, with only
two known cases amongst the vertebrates (Scantlebury et al. 2006). The hon-
eybee for instance, is such a eusocial species, characterized by its strict castes
and corresponding division of labor (Gould & Gould 1995). The ‘job descrip-
tion’ of a honeybee can be exhaustively captured with recourse to a bee’s sex
and age, disregarding, of course, the nutritionally allocated role of the queen
(Gould & Gould 1995). Due to kin-selection and inbreeding the inclusive fit-
ness of a eusocial colony has reached a (Nash) equilibrium, which strongly
favors considerable altruism. Furthermore, given the cognitive rigidity of the
species, this altruistic behavior will be completely hardwired. The upshot is
that the post-natal experiences of a honeybee factor very little into its social
fate.
15
16 CHAPTER 4. SOCIAL COORDINATION
Species “higher up” the phylogenetic ladder also exhibit social order, yet
here we see much more flexible social structuring. While the job of a hon-
eybee, with the exception of the queen, depends solely on her sex and age,
some species of birds have hierarchical structures that are regulated and en-
forced through a framework of obvious signals. Many species of birds possess
‘badges’ that illustrate their level of dominance. Harris’ Sparrows have var-
iegated plumage and when they form flocks of mixed ages in the winter, these
differences become meaningful. Males with darker heads and ‘bibs’ are older
and more dominant than their lightly colored conspecifics.
By dyeing lighter sparrows dark, Sievert Rohwer demonstrated that these
‘badges’ represent social status, since other lightly colored sparrows avoid
such darkened birds, even though they were of the same age and rank. Fur-
thermore, the dyed birds eventually dominated their undyed contemporaries
(Rohwer 1985). This shows that while the dark head or ‘bib’ is a genetically
encoded trait, the behavior that is associated with it depends crucially on the
behavior of the other sparrows. Social arrangements in Harris’ Sparrows are
therefore more sophisticated than those of honeybees as an animal’s geneti-
cally determined role can be overridden by social factors.
It is noteworthy that with the Harris’ Sparrows, the hierarchical signal is
essentially arbitrary from an evolutionary perspective; less like the hon-
estly signaling peacock’s tail—which thanks to its costliness communicates
high genetic quality (Zahavi 1975)—and more like a police man’s badge—the
meaning of which is purely normative. What this shows is that having status
signals is itself adaptively advantageous and not necessarily the form of the
signal.
When we consider a cognitively more advanced species yet, the social order
becomes increasingly modifiable and nuanced. Chimpanzees are a species on
the cusp of Gregorian cognition1and their social arrangements incorporate
factors that cannot be parameterized exhaustively through inheritance and
obvious signaling. Chimpanzees travel in flexible groups which are part of
larger society that splits and reconnects over time. Members of one group
may drift between the groups of its society. Scattered group members keep in
contact via the pant-hoot (Goodall 1986).
1Individual chimpanzees have “inner environments [that] are [more or less] informed by
the designed portions of the outer environment” (Dennett 1997, p. 131).
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While there is a strict hierarchical ordering amongst the males in the group,
the alpha male is not the only male to sire offspring. Low-ranking males
sometimes take females on a consortship, which means they lure them away
from the group before their ovulation and keep them isolated until they are
ready to conceive, thus securing sole access to her (Newton-Fischer 2004).
The strongest social bonds within the group, along with the bond between
mother and child, are those between adult males. These ‘friends’ travel to-
gether and are much more likely to groom, kiss, great or embrace each other
than are females (Goodall 1986). Males spend considerable time courting
their potential allies, as two lower-ranking males may team-up to dominate
a higher-ranking chimpanzee (Goodall 1986).
The trend that seems to be emerging is that the more plastic the brains of
creatures are, the more flexible, complicated, and variable their societies tend
to be. Although I suspect this statement should not be left unqualified, it does
make institutive sense, since the cognitive demands, e.g. memory, coordina-
tion, planning, etc., on individuals existing in mutable societies are greater
as a result of the multiplicity of differentiated interactions, than the require-
ments of being an unwitting member of an unchangeable social structure.
In the human domain, sociobiological explanations of behavior are seldom as
satisfying as such explanations are of the behavior of most other species. The
interaction between individuals with vastly plastic brains and impressive ar-
rays of cognitive tools, steeped in complex cultural traditions, elicits a degree
of unpredictability that outstrips most biological approaches of explication. It
is in such social structures that further, specialized accounts are necessary.




5.1 Stabilization of Society
Natural selection favors biological organism that deal increasingly efficiently
and intelligently with their demanding environment. This promotes plas-
ticity. The development of plastic increase co-evolves with the ever-greater
sophistication of the social structure of the group. As a result, the complexity
of interactions deepens, thus making unfavorable, chaotic and detrimental
interferences between the individuals likely. Coexisting in a society does not
simply mean sharing surroundings with one’s conspecifics. The behaviors of
the individuals must be constrained and adapted to each other in order to
comply with the interests of the group. Most constraints on social animals
are the same as those on non-social ones, as they are physical and biologi-
cal. There are some actions that no organisms can do, such as dematerialize
or stop aging. There are other constraints however, that seem to apply to
animals living in a social arrangement specifically and are not of a primary
physical nature.
Animals cooperate. Dennett describes an anecdote in which three lionesses
hunt wildebeest jointly employing impressive tactical methods. Lioness A
positions herself in plain view of the wildebeest, thus distracting their atten-
tion, lioness B creeps off to the left into a shallow ditch behind the wildebeest
and lioness C creeps off to the right, opposite lioness B on the other side of
the herd. With these positions assumed, lioness C jumps out and attacks the
herd, which darts away, leaping over the ditch in which lioness B is lying
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in wait. All lioness B must do is leap up and bring down one of the dozen
animals, thus “providing supper for all” ” (Dennett 2000).
Animals protect each other. Vervet monkeys issue predator alarm calls to
warn each other of impending danger.
“The type of alarm call that is given depends on the specific
kind of predator in the vicinity. A loud barking call is given for
leopards, a short, double syllable cough for eagles, and a “chutter”
sound is made for snakes. ... When the leopard call is heard, the
monkeys run to the trees; the eagle call provokes them to look up
into the air and seek shelter; hearing the snake call makes the
monkeys stand up on two legs and look in the grass” (Cheney &
Seyfarth 1990).
Explaining this social and cooperative behavior is usually approached through
one of two paradigms: either through kin-selection (Dawkins 1976)—this can
be very explanatorily potent with highly inter-related species—or through re-
ciprocal altruism (Axelrod 1984) with its mathematical tools of game theory.
Such theories seek to demonstrate the origins and perhaps the justification
of social behavior. I will focus more closely however on what characterizes
these social organizations once they are in place.
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) has been used extensively to model the
behavior of social organizations. In the gathering of food, EGT demonstrates
that the ‘communal sharer” strategy—a strategy in which individuals share
food when they are successful, but also demand it from others when they
are not—is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) and cannot be invaded
by the ‘egoist” strategy, which consists of individuals not sharing when they
are successful yet nonetheless demanding food from others when they are not
(Kameda et al. 2005).1 EGT is called thus, because it deals with the strategies
evolution has honed in on as the most adaptively advantageous. The ESS is
enforced entirely through the genetic hard-wiring of the organism, acquired
over generations and generations of natural selection.
While this makes it a fairly robust strategy with cognitively rigid species,
animals with greater cognitive plasticity (further up on Dennett’s cognitive
1The impossibility of invasion is essentially due to the high cost of fighting off ‘sharers”
and other ‘egoists’ when an ‘egoist’ happens to find food.
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scale) may have the ability to transgress against the genetically determined
strategies in keeping with their own interest. Higher primates, such as chim-
panzees, bonobos and humans, excel at social deception, sometimes termed
Machiavellian intelligence. Upon discovering food, a subordinate chimpanzee
can suppress his urge to eat it immediately, if there is a dominant in the vicin-
ity who would take the food off him were he to disclose it. The subordinate
may wait around, studiously avoiding gazing at the food, until the dominant
leaves (Byrne & Whiten 1989). The dominant however often detects the de-
ception, though uncertain of its cause, and thus wanders off only to hide until
the subordinate betrays his ‘intentions’, allowing him to leap from his hiding
place to apprehend the food after all (Byrne & Whiten 1989).
In this case, the deception on the part of the subordinate was decidedly not
in line with the ‘communal sharer’ strategy, yet he was cognitively flexible
and sophisticated enough to engage in it anyway. This shows that although
it may not be the best of the stable strategies, individuals who are smart
enough will attempt to outwit the constraints of such broad strategies. In
fact, there is a correlation between neo-cortex size of chimpanzees and their
skill at Machiavellian deception, suggesting that the smartest apes are also
the sneakiest (Byrne & Corp 2004).
Of course, such deception cannot run rampant, or there would be no societies.
If all chimpanzees were constantly deceptive and egoistic they would not co-
here as societies at all, yet chimpanzees have thoroughly well-structured and
successful social groups (see Chapter 4). It is likely that this problem does not
arise with chimpanzees, as deception is not such a common occurrence, given
their cognitive abilities. Humans however, are certainly cognitively capable
of deceiving often and convincingly, quite to the detriment of social cohesion.
What then secures that our societies are as strong as they are? Essentially
there must be mechanisms in place that constrain the permissible behavior of
individuals that go beyond the scope of EGT. Ultimately, I will argue, that the
measures entail making self-respecting, responsible agents out of biological
individuals.
In human social arrangement, there are forms of behavior that are not de-
creed by natural laws, but become rules nonetheless. The spectrum of such
behavior cannot be straightforwardly segmented into classes. Nonetheless,
this behavior extends from simple regularity, over recognizable norms to full-
blown rationally endorsed commitments. Let us begin at the most basic. A
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society works best if, like a well-oiled machine, all its wheels and cogs fit
into each other seamlessly and complimentarily. There are virtually infinite
possible ways for individuals of a society to come together to form a well-
fitting whole. Given the multiplicity of life experiences of the individuals—
which in turn give rise to a manifold of neurally connected networks in their
exceedingly plastic brains—together with the array of possible interactions
that could occur between individuals, the result is a highly complex matrix
of possible social formation. Not all formations of course are viable. For a
central planner to calculate successful behavior patterns for numerous indi-
viduals would be very complicated. Rather, a self-organizational effect comes
into play that steers societies to their equilibratory states. These equilibrium
states are often not adaptively advantageous in virtue of the specific details
of the arrangement, but rather in virtue of being equilibria in the first place,
just as the badges of the Harris” Sparrows are useful only within their con-
text and not absolutely.
Consider the laws that regulate drinking ages in various countries: in the
U.K. the drinking age is 18, in Germany it is 16 and in the U.S. people are
permitted alcohol when they are 21. Clearly, all of these regulations provide
a possible (and actual) method of managing the alcohol consumption of young
people and each is embedded in an socio-ideological framework that provides
justification for the specific age it decrees. As such, no option is better than
any other. But any option is better than no convention. It appears that within
a society, what is more important than finding an ideal equilibrium is finding
equilibria at all.2
2Of course, one can argue that some equilibria, those nearer global maxima of the possi-
bility space of strategies of a society, are “better” than others—for instance one may consider
21 to be an artificially inflated cut-off point—but even a local maximum is better than the
area immediately surrounding it.
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5.2 Stabilization of the Self
So far I have been discussing strategic equilibria on the levels of popula-
tion. EGT tells us that neither a population purely composed of ‘hawks’ (the
strategy of always fighting for resources or access to mates) nor one made
up entirely of ‘doves’ (who never fight anyone) is an ESS (Maynard Smith &
Price 1973). Rather a mixed strategy, in which the population is composed of
a certain number of hawks and a certain number of doves is evolutionarily
stable (Maynard Smith & Price 1973).3 Note that this mixed strategy con-
cerns the population and presupposes genetically fixed players who cannot
change ‘who they are’.
However, in a game where players are free to adopt either strategy at any
time and where they have memory of past interactions, ‘tit-for-tat’ also presents
an ESS. Tit-for-tat describes a strategy of “equivalent retaliation” in the sense
that ‘you get what you deserve’ (Axelrod 1984). With tit-for-tat, an individual
will act ‘hawkishly’ towards anyone who has previously acted ‘hawkishly’ to-
wards it and ‘dovishly’ towards previously encountered ‘doves’. As humans,
we easily have the cognitive prowess to employ (relatively simple) strategies
like tit-for-tat, rather than having to live out genetically determined behav-
ior on the basis of population level ESSs. Playing tit-for-tat may produce
both hawkish and dovish behavior in the same player, thus being better for
the individual than sticking to the same behavior no matter what.4 I want
to argue however, that such changeability of strategy, even given the prece-
dent by one’s interaction partner, is not the approach conducive to humans.
Rather than playing tit-for-tat, humans instill confidence in others to negoti-
ate ‘social deals’ with them, by presenting the potential partner with a stable
self.
Consider the well-oiled machine again. For it to work smoothly, each part
must follow a well-circumscribed path upon which the other parts may build.
A common acting exercise to build group coherence is indeed called The Ma-
chine. In it, actors one after the other join each other in using their body as
though it were a part of a machine. They remain stationary, but move their
bodies in all three dimensions otherwise. Once the first actor has established
a movement which he repeats on an endless loop, the second actor will join
3Typical values usually yield a stable ratio of about 1:2 hawks to doves.
4While the hawk:dove ratio may remain at a constant 1:2, this does not mean that not a
lot of hawks and doves get killed.
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him and mold her movement to the one that is already established. Fur-
thermore, her movement will complement and enhance that of the first actor.
This continues until all actors, perhaps ten or so, have joined the machine,
enhancing and expanding it, complicating it and making it seem like a giant
complex organism.
Figure 5.1: The Machine
It is important that each actor sticks with his motion. Obviously, if one ac-
tor who began with an up-down motion upon which the next has modeled
her down-up motion suddenly veers side-to-side, they will collide and the in-
tegrity of the entire machine will deteriorate akin to a toppling line of domi-
nos. Thus, once deciding on a motion, which each actor is free to do when
entering the game given the constraints of the motions already in the ma-
chine, each element of the machine must remain with its initial motion. In
order for the totality to work, the parts must be constant.
Of course, actors are only human and after existing in the machine for a
while, changes are indeed visible. However, they are not so much sudden
changes by an individual, but rather overall changes by the entire machine.
The machine tends to become slower and compacter. In a sense it becomes
more efficient, as parts will not jump as high above it, reach as far out of it,
spin as fast within it, while still maintaining the fluidity of its motion. If one
part does slow down so much that it begins to interfere with the motions of
the others, their continued movement will ensure that it gets back on track.
Within its own personal motion space each part may slacken as much as it
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likes, but once these effects extend beyond its immediate vicinity into the
domain of the machine at large such deviations will not be tolerated. The
tighter and more efficient the machine is, the less individual space each part
has and therefore the less aberration it is allowed.
In the same way as the machine can only function if the cogs maintain a
coherent action, so too does a social organization depend on the consistency
of its members. Societies are far more complicated than simple machine ex-
ercises for actors. Furthermore, they are not dissembled after 15 minutes
or half an hour, but extended temporally for many many generations. Also,
participation in society, as opposed to The Machine, is a matter of survival, a
matter of subsistence and of one’s very identity.
In The Machine, physical proximity ensures the consistency of the parts. In
societies however, such proximity is neither necessary nor sufficient. Yet a
society too depends crucially on the invariability of its constituents. In order
for a strong, cohesive, and progressing society to emerge, the elements must
be constant temporally extended variables. Every day an incredibly complex
mass of actions, transactions and interactions occur within a society. This is
simply because a large number of living organisms coexist on a limited space
and thus become factors to consider in one’s survival strategies. How can it
be, that this amorphous, gargantuan complex of actions does not collapse into
utter chaos and result in savagery?
Imagine for a moment that in addition to our four spatiotemporal dimen-
sions, there exists a further dimension. The first four dimensions are brim-
ming with actions that are vectors through time and space: a fairly messy
and difficult to control system. Now imagine that all these trajectories are
fixed to specific points in the fifth dimension. These points are unique in
this line dimension. Thus, by fixing the spatiotemporal action trajectories to
a single point in a further dimension, a source or reference point, for what
at first seems like an unwieldy multitude of actions, can be crystallized out.
This allows the actions to be considered not as individual unconnected events
with their own varied histories and justifications, but as spawns of a single
‘thing’ with but one history and justification. In other words, a multiplicity
of unwieldy events can be reduced to a manageable number of ‘points’, which
are much more stable and thus easily described.
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In this story, this ‘point’ is the agent, characterized by a specific identity, his
‘character’, from which all his actions seem to emerge. Although this point
must have a determinate ‘location’ (on the ‘character axis’ one might imagine)
it need not be completely static throughout. This point may change ‘location’
in the fifth dimension, but only at a slow and gradual pace, thus making
‘character’ changes virtually imperceptible in the ‘lower’ spatiotemporal di-
mensions.
This fifth dimension is of course a rather ridiculous fantasy. There is no other
dimension in which the constant agent resides and can thus reign over, or at
least be the standard for, the actions undertaken in the spatiotemporal do-
main. Yet we do perceive the existence of agents that are the impetus for
‘their’ actions. How then does this notion of coherent agent come about and
how is it maintained? In the next section I will explore how social pressures




Even without ‘points’ in a fifth dimension constraining actions that occur ‘be-
low’, these actions do appear to emanate from coherent bundles of agenthood.
This is (partly) the case, because pressure exists towards the consistency of
the individual. In order for an individual to be a beneficial member of soci-
ety, she must present a consistent unchanging track record to her contempo-
raries. Her actions affect others. This is what it means to live in a society.
Consider E-bay. Potential buyers check the feedback for a seller before mak-
ing a decision. Consistent good performance pays off. It results in a high
feedback rating, which buyers look for when choosing a seller. Of course,
someone with a lousy feedback rating could deliver perfectly on the very next
buy, or someone with an excellent rating could be disastrous with her next
buyer, yet we are more inclined to engage with people with a consistently
good track record. We believe that what holds for the past will also hold for
the future. This is because people behave consistently.
Does consistent behavior presuppose a genuine constant that resides within
the individual, guiding the actions to ensure consistency? Dennett has fa-
mously argued that such a notion of a self is not an actual entity in the world,
but rather like the center of gravity of an object, a fictional, yet explanatorily
potent, “abstractum” or “illata” (an inferred entity) (Dennett 1992). To de-
mand anything more concrete of such a center of gravity would be
“a category mistake. A center of gravity is just an abstractum.
It’s a fictional object. But when I say it’s a fictional object, I do not
mean to disparage it; it’s a wonderful fiction object, and it has a
perfectly legitimate place within serious, sober, echt physical sci-
ence” (Dennett 1992).
It retains this ‘legitimate place’ in virtue of its descriptive power of the self
as an ongoing narrative; spun out within the consistency constraints of char-
acter creation.
“We cannot undo those parts of our pasts that are determinate,
but our selves are constantly being made more determinate as we
go along in response to the way the world impinges on us (Dennett
1992).
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The narration of the self is the interpretation of one’s behavioral future so
that it becomes an extension of one’s behavioral past resulting in one, contin-
uous identity.
Sartre famously rejected the Aristotelian notion that humans possessed an
essence prior to existence and argued that it is through the choices they make
that they create their identity (Sartre 2001). Nonetheless, the question of
whether a person’s character is determined through her genes is still con-
troversial, especially in the field of law (Rothstein 1999). While pathologies
such as alcoholism or depression clearly affect the possibility range of a per-
son’s ultimate character, extensive empirical investigation has shown that a
person’s character is not as real as we might imagine.
In 1963, in the aftermath of World War Two, which saw an entire nation
obeying the authority of an extremist few, Stanley Milgram set out to test
‘average’ people for there willingness to obey orders that contradict their con-
science. He set up an experiment in which he effortlessly coaxed everyday
participants—men between 20 and 50 years of age, ranging from elemen-
tary school dropouts to subjects with PhDs—to inflict a series of what they
believed to be increasingly painful and ultimately potentially fatal doses of
electric current on their fellow subject, upon being ordered to do so, in ever
more decisive language, by what essentially amounts to men in white coats.
“Stark authority was pitted against the subjects’ strongest moral
imperatives against hurting others, and, with the subjects’ ears
ringing with the screams of the victims, authority won more of-
ten than not. The extreme willingness of adults to go to almost
any lengths on the command of an authority constitutes the chief
finding of the study and the fact most urgently demanding expla-
nation” (Milgram 1974).
Before conducting his studies, Milgram had questioned fellow psychologists
on the expected outcome of the study. All agreed that only an insignifi-
cantly small percentage of participants—0.1 per cent, the sadists—would go
through with the experiment (Milgram 1963). This shows that labeling peo-
ple as specific ‘personality’ types is misleading and that character is context
specific.
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Given this apparent anti-realism of character, why then does its persistence
seem so natural to us? We, and the psychologists Milgram polled, do not feel
as though character is context dependent, but rather view it as an unwaver-
ing, constant property of a person. When we get to know someone it is their
behavior, their reactions we learn. We become able to predict their thoughts,
feeling and actions within given situations. Of course, people’s tastes and
preferences are hormonally regulated, as well as having co-developed with
their experiences, allowing us to gauge people we know quite accurately
(Elfhag & Erlanson-Albertsson 2006). We build up expectations of people’s
actions based on models we have constructed of them from their past actions.
The better we get to know somebody, the more honed these models become
and the less room for deviation remains.
There are behaviors that seem from the outside to lie within the possibility
space for a person and others that seem to lie outside it. When someone
commits an action that according to our model lies outside of their possibility
space, we are dumbstruck. When the finicky wine aficionado asks for wine
from the box we think something must be wrong with him. We say things like
“he’s not being himself”. Repeated such action reminds of the well-known
Hollywood plot in which a doppelganger appropriates the life of someone he
is not. If upon demanding an explanation from the epicurean for his odd
behavior he responds that he simply “feels like it”, we might not quite believe
it. We might even think he is acting on a dare. If however he professes to be
expressing a perfectly genuine desire, we somehow do not feel like he is the
same person anymore. In this sense, our behaviors define ‘who we are’.
Along with Dennett, Ross argues that just as novelists must create fictional
characters that are stable individuals, so too are “biological people ... disposed
by genetic disposition to narrate stable selves” (Ross 2004). It is through the
consistency of behavior that we take on a well-defined temporally extended
identity, both for ourselves and others.
The older we are, the narrower our possibility space of behavior becomes. As
Ross suggests,
“When I was six years old it was still possible for me to be many
more sorts of people than the person I now am in my forties” (Ross
2004).
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Furthermore he argues that if he were to upset the stable character he had
created, by making a far-reaching, uncharacteristic decision,
“I’d undermine the whole complex of expectations about me as
‘me’ that make it possible for me to reach equilibria in the bat-
tery of daily coordination games I simultaneously play with many
people in my life, including first-time interactions with erstwhile
strangers” (Ross 2004).
The progressive narrowing of behavioral possibilities thus, is a necessary con-
sequence of the creation of a coherent, interactable self. When you are born,
your space of possibilities, though constrained by your physical and innate
psychological material, is still enormously vast. (It is perfectly conceivable
that the little girl that became Mother Theresa might have developed into
an atheist or an accountant.) Later in life, not only does one get physically
too old to perform certain roles, such as mother or child actor, but there are
potential life paths that simply no longer fit with the decisions and paths
one has followed thus far. One is ‘locked into one’s life’ courtesy of ‘historical
path-dependence’ (Clark, personal communication).
This consistency of character is so vital, as it is a requirement for interaction
within a social context. In our prehistoric past, as well as today, we must
engage in social contracts with others in situations that are critical to our
survival. ‘Survival’ here is a potentially misleading term. What it actually
means for us is getting as much world-negotiating power out of our cultural
mind tools as possible—without having to wait around for a corresponding
advancement in our biological brains—because this is the niche evolution has
chosen for us. As outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, we are a species with consid-
erable cognitive plasticity, existing in complex and volatile social structures,
under the evolutionary pressure to cope as well as possible with our environ-
ment. The proposal is thus that the stabilization of the self facilitates the
coordination of these elements in a fitness-enhancing way.
Without wanting to venture on a detour into the tradition of contraction-
ism, I will outline Ross’ game theoretical approaches to social contracts. He
describes a model in which agents interact in coordination games in which
the aim is to arrive at equilibria. The individuals have certain strategies
with which they approach such games. In order to reach an equilibrium
“in complex communities containing many individuals, [where] complications
5.3. CHARACTER 31
are massively compounded ... the strategy sets available to each individual
are sharply constrained in advance of each specific interaction” (Ross 2004).
Furthermore:
“Some constraints will be supplied by biology, physics, and shared
culture. I can’t, in selecting coordination strategies, promise or
threaten to fly out the window, and I can’t credibly threaten to kill
myself if you don’t pass the salt. However essential these sorts of
background constraints might be, however, they can’t carry nearly
enough of the load to get us to the kinds of refined social equilibria
on which human communities actually manage to converge” (Ross
2004).
Ross’ next move it to identify an agent’s utility function, i.e. the strategy
which she employs in a given coordination game, with the self she has nar-
rated into existence. This allows him to explain the phenomenon of narrating
stable selves into existence, with the necessity for a determinate utility func-
tion in social coordination games.
“[M]ost people achieve tolerable success as satisficers over the
problem space [of possible self-narratives]. They do this at the
cost of increasingly sacrificing flexibility in new game situations.
This happily, trades off against the fact that as their selves become
more stable, they can send clearer signals to partners, thereby re-
ducing the incidence of both miscoordination by error in games ...
and of inadvertently selecting destructive Prisoner’s Dilemma sce-
narios ... This ... helps explain the prevailing stability of selves in
a feedback relationship. It is sensible for people to avoid attempts
at coordination with highly unstable selves” (Ross 2004).
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5.4 Enforcement
It is in the pressure towards behavioral consistency that Don Ross sees the
impetus for the digital character of communication. As discussed previously,
he argues that the smooth functioning of a group requires definable nodes
at which selves (individuals defined by utility function/character narratives)
can aggregate. Because selves are defined in this way, it is important that
a (biological) person inhabits a clear stance with respect to a proposed in-
teraction, rather than exhibiting a certain likelihood of interaction. It is the
digital nature of language, the ‘either/or-ness’ of words, that enables this fac-
ulty, rather than the analog gradation of non-linguistic communication (such
as body language).
Ross points out that the digitalization of communication is a pay-off between
subtlety of expression and ability to overlap semantic content with others.
He suggests that not only is it quite likely that your grasp of ‘democracy’, is
slightly different from mine, given our different experiential histories, but
that, as shown by Wittgenstein, we cannot even determine unequivocally
what each other’s conceptions of democracy actually are (Ross 2004, p. 623).
We need to get beyond this initial difficulty however, if we want to achieve any
progress in our interactions with each other. Thus, we accord a public label
to the term on which we both more-or-less agree, accepting that the other un-
derstands it roughly in the same way we do. It is through this digitalization
of meaning that there can be agreement.
“[We] don’t ... have a shared independent metric ... for compar-
ing different possible extents to which we could mean slightly or
substantially different things. The digital character of our signal-
ing system, however, locks us into tacit agreement to try to coordi-
nate our respective conceptions around this particular fixpoint of
the system” (Ross 2004).
But digitalization is also a tool towards stabilizing the behavioral conduct
of the members in one’s group. If in The Machine motions were limited to
a digital array of movements, then, while the options of interaction would
be minimized, their success would be heightened, since if one element fails
to execute her well-defined motion, there would be a clear infraction of the
rules, she could easily be found out and corrected from her deviated path.
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Essentially this eliminates any fuzziness about the boundaries concerning
acceptable behavior, thus avoiding a sorites-like breakdown of The Machine.
In a situation in which individuals interact, it is in the interest of the group
that each individual constitutes a stable self. Ross notes that in order to
reduce the incidence of destructive Prisoner Dilemma scenarios, individuals
need to be able to trust each other. And this can only happen if individuals
are sufficiently consistent and predictable. He thus concludes that,
“given the massive interdependency among people, this incen-
tivizes everyone to regulate the stability of those around them
through dispensation of social rewards and punishments” (Ross
2004, p. 627).5
This incentive to regulate the stability of others primarily furthers the pro-
liferation of primarily behavioral norms. It is important that one’s actions
paint a picture of a stable self with which others can interact. However, be-
havioral norms are deeply interlinked with the perceptual, evaluative and
cognitive norms one obeys. As a result these norms too are targeted, either
indirectly, or as result of the pressure on behavioral norms (see Chapter 6).
Society needs agents to behave coherently in order for the society as a whole
to be successful. This is what norms do, as they stipulate that individuals
should conform and act consistently.
Let me take a moment to consider the implications of what I have outlined so
far. It is one thing to show that it is in the game-theoretical interest of indi-
viduals to constitute coherent selves in order to partake in social interaction
and quite another to claim that this is therefore what they ought or should
do. In fact, why should the phenomenon of self-coherence be accredited to
the normative requirement of social pressure and not simply to the Hebbian
connections fashioned in the brain? If we accept that humans constitute co-
herent selves, why can’t we just argue that it is literally the case that they
cannot physically make decisions that go completely contrary to their grain,
5This externally influenced stabilization may be what gives rise to what Sartre has
termed ‘alienation’. This is the phenomenon that part of who one is, lies inextricably in
the hands of others.
“The world includes other people, and as a consequence I am not merely the
revealer of the world but something revealed in the projects of those others. Thus
who I am is not merely a function of my own projects, but is also a matter of my
‘being-for-others’ ” (Sartre 2001).
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as these pathways have been closed off neurologically? Why introduce nor-
mativity, a difficult to grasp and seemingly unnaturalizable property?
The answer is however, that while an accountant will in all likelihood not
suddenly choose to become a lion-tamer (Ross 2004), he could. People do
make radical life altering decisions.6 They leave family and friends behind
and join a Buddhist monastery in Nepal. Or they opt to live in a tree-house
and derive all their energy from the sun and the turnips they grow in their
garden. Admittedly, this does not happen often. Usually individuals narrate
selves into existence gradually, with the opportunity to test out, in reality or
imagination, what the existential impact of their decision will be. Further-
more, each successive life decision is mediated by the values accrued through
previous decisions. Nonetheless, people sometimes do ‘suddenly wake up’ to
find that they have been trudging along a path of life that although seemingly
desirable at the time, they actually find intolerable. Thus they undertake a
radical move and change their life completely. As Ross points out, this hap-
pens in the so-called midlife crisis.
Such actions need not represent radical instability of the self. Rather they
are akin to a paradigm shift of the self that reorients and reprioritizes one’s
values at a given moment in time. Ross, in keeping with Dennett, argues that
once Arthur Conan Doyle had written a few of the Sherlock Holmes books,
he was no longer able to let Holmes recite limericks without destroying the
character Holmes. To me it seems that while this would be a (fairly) radical
move for a novelist it is still a possible one. Conan Doyle could weave this
new character trait in gradually, believably, and I suspect there would be
little outrage from the readership. Moreover, given that novelists are forced
to paint their characters in relatively broad strokes—even the most intricate
character portrayal falls short of a genuine narration of the self—any radical
shift from the previous expository path, which alas is all the reader has of the
character, will be jolting. A real-life individual however possesses flesh-and-
bone temporal and physical continuity in addition to the linear progression
of his character and thus must not fear sudden annihilation or termination if
she makes an uncharacteristic decision.
Ross claims that “Holmes can’t do this sort of thing [compose limericks] and
still be Holmes” (Ross 2004, p. 626). Real people can however unexpectedly
6Still within the constraints of their genetically and ontogenetically determined psycho-
logical underpinnings.
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take up limerick composing. The can have a sudden sex change or become
born-again Christians. A person is a complex interplay of complementary
and contrasting desires and values and does not go out of existence when
one value falls off the radar or suddenly pops to the top on the list of priori-
ties. The fact that people can and do reshuffle their values, thus potentially
altering their ‘character description’ suggests that consistent behavioral pat-
terns are neither neurologically nor genetically necessitated and that game-
theoretical sensitivities cannot fully map human behavior. Rather there are
strong incentives to the individual to present a coherent self to the world and
to herself.
36 CHAPTER 5. STABILIZATION
5.5 Objections
Before I can continue with the exposition of this account of self-stabilization,
a few words must be inserted that critically assess the notion of self. Ross
identifies agents with utility functions. An agent is parameterized exclu-
sively through this function. This means that with every change of utility
function, a new agent is created. Of course this new agent might be only a
slightly altered version of the old one, but new she is nonetheless. However,
Ross does not employ the term ‘agent’ in an abstract, theoretical way. Rather,
it is intended to be the very thing that makes up the ‘identity’ or ‘character’
of a person.
What justifies the assumption that a person is a utility function? At least
intuitively it seems that the ‘me’ that engages in social interactions today is
the same ‘me’ as the one who interacted with others yesterday. Many more
factors contribute to my ongoing identity than what can be summed up in
my behavior at a certain moment in time. Even after a radical shift in my
utility function, such as a sudden act of shaving off all my hair, it is difficult
to imagine that I would not still be myself. Ross might reply that I am mis-
understanding his usage of ‘utility function’, that he is interested in how an
agent can be defined in a game-theoretical situation. In other words, he is
simply stipulating that an agent is defined by her utility function. But this
does not merit the leap from agent to self. If Ross is employing this definition
of person because it is well suited to his game theoretical approach, he cannot
use game theory to justify it.
Another difficulty may be that Ross is attempting to straddle two positions
that might be mutually exclusive. For Dennett, the self is an epiphenomena—
essentially a repository for past behavior. Its persistence gives the semblance
of agenthood. Yet in Ross’ picture, the self does have an, albeit indirect, effect
on what actions the agent undertakes. Not only is there a semblance of a
coherent self or agent signaling to the world that it is a good candidate with
whom to enter into social contracts, rather, this self, on Ross’ view also pro-
vides the guidance for any future action. The self, for Ross is defined by the
utility function with which one enters into a game and the resulting utility
functions can only vary marginally from the original one. Yet Dennett sees
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the notion of self as something rather more abstract. For him, the self re-
ally has no causal influence on the actions of the individual. A coherent self
emerges more as a result than as a cause of one’s behavior
Ross might benefit from adopting a version of the narrative self slightly more
causally efficacious than Dennett’s. Dennett is criticized by Ismael (2006)
and Velleman (2006) for his insistence that the self is fictional. While Ismael
and Velleman agree that the self is constituted through narrative, they main-
tain that it is this narrated self that actively governs the possibility realm of
the future self. In essence, the self has genuinely narrated itself into non-
epiphenomenal, agency-endowed existence. As Velleman (2006) puts it,
“whereas he regards an autobiography as fictive and conse-
quently false in characterizing its protagonist, I regard it as both
fictive and true. We invent ourselves, I shall argue, but we really
are the characters whom we invent.”
According to Jennan Ismael,
“[s]elf-portraits guide rather than merely record activity in those
special moments when the myriad competing local claims and in-
clinations that act as forces on behaviour don’t push decisively
in one direction and the autobiography producing module tells
the agent, in a simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive sense,
what he is going to do” (Ismael n.d.).
Dennett’s account is one of self-organization. This means that there is no
central planner at work which lines up the future autobiographical facts with
those of the past. Therefore, the self is ‘only’ a fiction. Ismael and Velleman
believe that in some situations, the self can actively steer the behavior of the
organism.7
Overall, it seems it would be useful for Ross to adopt a notion of the self
more along the lines of Velleman’s or Ismael’s conception, where the self can
causally (at least to a degree) constrain and govern its future. This is not
a view to which I am particularly sympathetic, mostly because I think it
requires problematic causal contortions. (See (Dennett 1991).) Rather than
7In Chapter 6.2.2 I discuss one of Velleman’s suggestions of how the self can govern its
future trajectory.
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a central planner needing to nudge the self into the right direction, thereby
ensuring coherence among the parts, the self might function more like a flock
of birds, in which coherence, although appearing to be explicitly guided, is
‘just’ the result of each bird conforming to the behavior of the other birds.
CHAPTER 6
Language
6.1 Second Order Cognitive Dynamics
Human beings appear to stand alone amongst animals in their linguistic abil-
ities. Language is a formidable cognitive tool available to our species. I will
not attempt to discuss the origins or evolution of language. Suffice to say that
once it had emerged through its necessarily evolutionary bottleneck (Kirby &
Hurford 2002), it radically altered the cognitive landscape of humans. Lan-
guage is a powerful cognitive tool, most importantly, because it allows for
what I will refer to as the vehicling of thought. Clark (1998) convincingly
illuminates this important phenomenon.
“[A]ssociating a perceptually simple, stable, external item (such
as a word) with an idea, concept or piece of knowledge effectively
freezes the concept into a sort of cognitive building block- an item
that can then be treated as a simple baseline feature for future
episodes of thought, learning and search” (Clark 1998).
Words and sentences transform the computation space in a similar way to
how physical forces transformed the universe seconds after the big bang;
sculpting elementary entities/relations out of the hitherto undifferentiated
cosmic soup and setting them off on their unabated trajectory of combining
into ever greater and more complex structures. Language too molds a disar-
ray of impermanent and elusive thoughts into concrete entities, thus allowing
them to become manipulable objects for further cognition.
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“[T]he (putative) role of words and sentences (preserved and
transmitted through the medium of public language) to act as trans-
formers of the very shape of the cognitive and computational spaces
we inhabit” (Clark 1998).
Clark presents a nice example of how attaching an external label or tag to
a cognitive recognition allows for further cogitation on that recognition. Nu-
merous studies have shown that non-human animals are capable of making
same-different judgments, based either simply on physical similarity or more
abstractly, on membership in a certain group (Thompson & Oden 1996). How-
ever, this result has been irreproducible with second-order relations, such
as whether two judgments that may be ‘same’ or ‘different’ are themselves
the same or different, when testing animals that have not received either
language/symbol training, such as Irene Pepperberg’s grey parrot ‘Alex’ or
Sue Savage-Rumbaugh’s chimpanzee ‘Kanzi’ (Premack & Premack 1983).1
Thompson surmises, in keeping with Premack, that
“there is a profound disparity between humans and nonhuman
species in their natural ability to make judgments about the iden-
tity of abstract relations. According to Premack, only humans
beyond infancy ... and those chimpanzees with a history of ...
‘language-training’ ... can make abstract equivalence judgments
about relations between relations” (Thompson & Oden 1996).
Thompson then proceeds to demonstrate that it is the symbolic anchoring
function of language—or as Clark says, “the experience of associating ab-
stract relations with arbitrary tokens” (Clark 1998)—that accounts in part
for this disparity.2 The conclusion thus attained by Thompson et al, is that
“it is the use of simple, arbitrary external tags for indepen-
dently identifiable relational properties that opens up the more
1First order matching might involve recognizing that two items, such as two identical
balls, are the same. Second order matching requires being able to match Set A, two identical
toothbrushes, with Set B, two identical books, and also being able to match Set C, a feather
and a bucket, with Set D, a plastic shovel and a hat. While the first order task requires only
the recognition of similarities between objects, the second order task requires matching on
the level of relations between sets (C and D are the same in that they both contain items
that are different).
2Of course we should not overlook the necessity of the appropriate neural resources for
the task. You can expose a monkey to as much language as you like and it won’t be able to
perform second order matching.
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abstract space of knowledge about relations between relations”
(Clark 1998).
Language is composed of low-dimensional, cheap, publicly accessible objects:
the vehicled incarnations of cognitive processes. These are the labels, such as
‘same’ or ‘different’ that allow for comparison on levels that are unattainable
without symbolic anchoring. A further advantage of having such objects is
that they are stabler than thoughts. Cognitive states are naturally very com-
plex, with a multitude of channels inputting new information at all times.
Our senses are slaves to contextuality, forever adjusting to the situation they
find themselves in. However,
“[b]y “freezing” our own thoughts in the memorable, context-
resistant and modality-transcending format of a sentence we thus
create a special kind of mental object—an object which is apt for
scrutiny from multiple different cognitive angles, which is not doomed
to alter or change every time we are exposed to new inputs or in-
formation, and which fixes the ideas at a fairly high level of ab-
straction from the idiosyncratic details of their proximal origins in
sensory input” (Clark 1998).
In rendering our originally highly dimensional cognitive states as neat mean-
ing bundles,
“[l]anguage stands revealed as a key resource by which we ef-
fectively redescribe our own thoughts in a format which makes
them available for a variety of new operations and manipulations”
(Clark 1998).
Linguistic symbols become candidates for propositional manipulation both in
an internal and inter-personal domain. These objects are reusable and do not
disintegrate upon use. In fact, their meaning is reinforced and strengthened
with every additional application. Language is first and foremost a commu-
nicative tool. However, it is successfully communicative qua its ‘objectness’—
it deals in well-defined terms upon which there is tacit agreement amongst
the language users. Linguistic creatures can not only jointly attend to one
object, they can also jointly consider an abstract idea. As soon as a thought
or cognitive state is named, it becomes the potential object of consideration
for anyone who possesses that name in her vocabulary. This means that the
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computational power that can be expended on this object is exponentially
greater than were it an unvehicled, undifferentiated state ‘residing’ solely in
one brain. Just as the introduction of the Euro allowed for unencumbered
commerce and direct comparison between markets in the European Mone-
tary Union, so too does the ascent of language facilitate the comparison of
thoughts and the distribution of problem-solving or other mental calculations
onto multiple brains.
This ‘thinking about thinking’ is what Clark has termed “second order cogni-
tive dynamics” (Clark 1998). In becoming de-coupled from the non-linguistic
cognitive mesh, thoughts become object in their own right, which means they
can become objects of further thought.
“Only creatures who are able to make their thoughts into sta-
ble, attendable, scrutinizable objects, by explicitly vehicling them
in some way, can then turn the apparatus of thinking onto the act
of thinking itself” (Clark 2002a).
Clark notes that,
“[i]t is because we can think about our own thinking that we
can actively structure our world in ways designed to promote, sup-
port and extend our own cognitive achievements” (Clark 1998).
The language driven resculpting of the cognitive space has vehicled thoughts
into workable elements. This makes them available to assessment, criticism,
endorsement; essentially an evaluative stance can be and is adopted towards
them. Of course, this evaluation must occur with respect to some referential
framework. A major part of this framework, I want to suggest, is the pres-
sure towards conformity, both within the trajectory of an individual, but also
between such individuals within a social arrangement. In the same way as
social arrangement can apply consistency promoting pressure to the behavior
of individuals, so too can it, given our ability for second order cognitive manip-
ulation, apply pressure to the thoughts of individuals. Akin to The Machine,
in which the motions of the parts had to adhere to well-defined trajectories
for the whole to function smoothly, thoughts have to stick to the beaten track
in order for individuals to function smoothly, both as themselves and within
society.
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Construed in one way this is just an extension of the pressure towards con-
sistent behavior. If a designer were to want to create a person who acts con-
sistently throughout her life, one way of achieving this would be to design
her so that she thinks consistently too. (The wine lover will reliably order ex-
pensive wine if he reliably believes that expensive wine is worth paying a lot
of money for.) In our status as mind-tool endowed Gregorian creatures, the
disposition to behave consistently need not be hardwired or conditioned—two
relatively rigid design approaches, as discussed in Chapter 3—instead it can
be achieved through affecting the consistency of our thoughts, which govern
(at least the willful) actions.
6.2 Normative Policing
6.2.1 Social Policing
Through language, thoughts can actively police other thoughts. In the pur-
suit of coherence with one’s previous self, evolution has created a powerful
ally in the linguistic thought policing activities of thoughts. Through lan-
guage, humans can actively enforce measures that increase conformity. Such
measures appear in the form of norms.
Both evaluative and behavioral norms arise through these acts of controlling.
Such norms are incredibly pervasive in our world. Some are explicitly formu-
lated in the form of rules or laws. Others provide the implicit guidelines for
our behaviors and evaluations. At first it may seem as though behavioral
norms can be divided into two categories: pragmatically useful ones (such
as the driving on a specified side of a road) and arbitrary ones (such as the
wearing of suits to the office). Essentially however, this is merely a difference
of degree: all norms are both useful and arbitrary. Importantly, we must not
confuse the content, i.e. the specific details, of the norm, with the circum-
stance it regulates. While it is useful that we all drive on one side of the road,
it is arbitrary which side. Similarly, while it may be arbitrary what people
wear to the office (or to the vernissage, given the flippancy of fashion), it may
not be arbitrary that they all wear the same thing.
Uniform office wear is a norm that demands adherence from individuals who
engage in interactions and social contracts within the domain in which it
reigns. Essentially, it represents a Nash equilibrium, just as much as driving
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on the right or the left side of the road. A Nash equilibrium reflects a strategy
in a game that, if all players adopt it, no player benefits from deviating from
it (Maynard Smith 1982). However, it is not the wearing of a suit and tie in
itself that represents a Nash equilibrium—wear it to an artistic retreat and
you will be rejected as aloof and pompous—rather, the stable strategy, the
Nash equilibrium is doing as everyone else does—conforming. In wearing the
suit and tie, one demonstrates one’s conformity with the prevailing norms of
an environment. Engaging in the rules that exist in an environment means
that one commits oneself to that social order. One actively pursues conformity
with the elements and ideologies of one’s environment.
It is hard to see why someone would choose to wear a suit and a tie every day,
other than because it represents the norm in the environment with which
he wishes to interact. As with constricting suits, there may be a certain
amount of inconvenience or suffering involved in adhering to a norm. Agoniz-
ing beauty rituals, such as waxing, plucking, extreme dieting and countless
other horrors are undertaken to achieve conformity with a norm. Through en-
gaging in this behavior, one is not striving for an ideal of beauty, but rather
attempts to be like everybody else in one’s social environment. (Different
social environments demand different degrees of extremity of beauty ritual.)
One signals one’s endorsement of norm even more strongly if the strategy one
must employ to do so involves an element of discomfort. One shows how far
one is willing to go for the sake of conformity.
The arbitrariness of the content (not circumstance) of the norm and the ex-
treme measures one is willing to undertake in order to conform to it and all
subsequent prevailing norm in one’s environment, indicates that what one is
ultimately endorsing is not a row of specific norms, but the norm of confor-
mity itself. Through conforming to the norm du jour one demonstrates that
one is in general a conformity-endorsing individual. The Nash equilibrium
after all is not hairlessness or skinniness, but being like everyone else.
With the contents of thought linguistically vehicled, the pressure of not only
bringing one’s behavior in line with existing norms, but also one’s thoughts
becomes considerable. Solomon Asch demonstrated that not even something
as private as one’s perceptual norms is off-limits for the social pressures for
conformity. The applicability and effectiveness of this pressure is possible
solely because language allows us to “wrest[...] concepts from their interwo-
ven connectionist nests” (Dennett 1993). In Asch’ study, participants were
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asked to judge the relative lengths of three lines, with respect to a fourth.
The three were sufficiently different in length to make this task easy. After
a few rounds however, a participant found himself in a situation were all the
other participants (seven to eight people) gave an utterly wrong, but unani-
mous answer. In a significant number of cases this lead to him to go against
his own perceptual information and adhere to the opinion of the majority.
“Whereas in ordinary circumstances individuals matching the
lines will make mistakes less than 1 per cent of the time, under
group pressure the minority subjects swung to acceptance of the
misleading majority’s wrong judgments in 36.8 per cent of the se-
lections” Asch:Opinions.
Asch’s experiment is a prime example of our linguistically enabled capacity
of turning our thoughts onto themselves in order to critique and evaluate
them. The conformist participants are not suffering from an optical illusion
in which the wrongly stated line suddenly appears of the correct length. Sub-
jects recognize the discrepancy between what they see and what the majority
(allegedly) sees and this unsettles them. They build elaborate constructs for
themselves in order to justify their betrayal of their senses in favor of their
conformity with the group. As Asch (1955) suggests some “quickly reached
the conclusion: “I am wrong, they are right”. Others yielded in order “not
to spoil your results”.” Furthermore, some “subjects ... construed their dif-
ference from the majority as a sign of some general deficiency in themselves,
which at all costs they must hide” (Asch 1955). This is an example of the polic-
ing capacity of conformity driven considerations, which is only from within a
framework of second-order cognitive dynamics.
As Clark notes,
“Perhaps it is public language that is responsible for a com-
plex of rather distinctive features of human thought ... viz., our
ability to display second-order cognitive dynamics. ... Examples
would include: recognizing a flaw in our own plan or argument,
and dedicating further cognitive efforts to fixing it; reflecting on
the unreliability of our own initial judgements in certain types of
situation and proceeding with special caution as a results [own em-
phasis]; coming to see why we reached a particular conclusion by
46 CHAPTER 6. LANGUAGE
appreciating the logical transitions in our own thoughts” (Clark
1998).
6.2.2 Policing of the Self
The policing faculties of language that enforce normative social influence
(Deutsch & Gerard 1955) also have an intra-personal counterpart. Clark
(1998) discusses the significance of language in facilitating the reduction of
on-line deliberation. Along with Michael Bratman, Clark suggests that
“the creation of explicit plans may play a special role in reduc-
ing the on-line cognitive load on resource-limited agents like our-
selves. The idea here is that our plans have a kind of stability
which pays dividends by reducing the amount of deliberation in
which we engage as we go about much of our daily business. Of
course, new information can, and often does, cause us to revise
our plans. But we do not let every slight change prompt a re-
assessment of our plans, intentions, even when other things being
equal, we might now choose slightly differently. Human plans and
intentions, Bratman suggests, play the role of blocking a waste-
ful process of continual re-assessment and choice, except in cases
where there is some quite major pay-off for the disruption” (Clark
1998).
By expressing our intentions in langauge they become stabilized and less sub-
ject to constant alteration pending insignificant environmental input. Hav-
ing a plan about something can override potential desires to act otherwise.
Once an intention is formulated in language, there is a sense in which we are
bound by it. Once I say to myself that I will go jogging at six, I feel like I
ought to go. If six o’clock passes and I do not go, I have to justify my failure
somehow, even though I may not have told anyone about my intention. My
formulating of the plan thus simultaneously acts as an enforcer.
But why should my stating of an intention have any normative force over me?
David Velleman gives one explanation of this phenomenon in his discussion
of the self-governance of an agent (see 5.5).
“I think that the statement “I’m going out for a walk” can some-
times be causally responsible for the speaker’s going out for a walk.
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Before making the statement, the person’s motives for taking a
walk may not outweigh his motives against taking a walk ... But
they may be sufficient to produce the statement “I’m going out for
a walk,” and this statement may then bring into play an additional
motive for taking a walk. The speaker’s love of the outdoors and
his desire for exercise may now be significantly reinforced by a
further motive for example, the desire not to have spoken falsely.
Having said he’s going out for a walk, the agent faces two alter-
natives: either go out for a walk or be in the position of having
asserted a falsehood. And taking a walk may well be preferable to
having said what turns out to be untrue” (Velleman 1997).
Velleman suggests that the normative aspect arises from her desire to avoid
“asserting a falsehood”. This however does not explain why the speaker
would say “I’m going out for a walk” in the first place. If Velleman is correct,
she is actively putting herself in a situation where she is under an obligation
that can cause her to do something potentially unpleasant or difficult.
In fact, the coerciveness of stating intentions, Velleman argues, is the very
reason we engage in it.
“As you putter around the office at the end of the day, you fi-
nally say, “I’m going home,” not because you were already about to
leave, but because saying so will prompt you to leave. As your hand
hovers indecisively over the candy dish, you say, “No, I won’t,” not
because you weren’t about to take a candy, but because saying so
may stop you from taking one” (Velleman 2006).
By uttering such intentions, an individual normatively binds herself to their
execution. One reason she may behave in such a way is because the action
thus brought about is one that can help to align her with the consistent self
she is trying to present to the world (see Chapter 5.3). Even without uttering
the intention to a listener, the speaker nonetheless puts herself into a position
of having to comply with her own dictum, if she is to retain consistency with
herself. (She is not a consistent individual if she says one thing and does
another.) We are reminded of Ross’ insistence that if I upset the stable entity
I create, “I’d undermine the whole complex of expectations about me as ‘me’ ”
5.3 and that “relatively stable selves ... are the most precious properties that
biological people come by” (Ross 2004, p. 626).
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Therefore we would expect to find individuals utter normatively binding in-
tentions, the execution of which will enforce the identity they have erected
(or are attempting to erect (see Ross’ view on self-stabilization as discussed
in Chapter 5.3)), rather than ones that are completely out of line with their
previous selves. (“I won’t have that piece of chocolate,” rather than, “Today
I’ll skin an antelope using only Acheulian stone tools,” provided that you are
not an archeologist doing field work.) Furthermore, when such atypical in-
tentions do become formulated, they should wield less normative power over
the individual. (We would expect someone to feel guiltier about reneging on
the chocolate rather than the antelope commitment.) We thus endorse con-
sistency with our previous selves by actively telling ourselves to do so.
6.2.3 Florid Policing
I have discussed two ways in which norms can arise and be maintained, viz.
through social pressure and self-directed inducement, but these alone cannot
account for the prevalence of norms in our social arrangement. In order to
explain the pervasiveness of norms, we must exploit second-order cognitive
dynamics more fully. What is required is not only the vehicling of thought,
which consequently allows for thoughts to become objects of further thought,
but the awareness of our ability to do so.
Dennett has coined the term florid representing, which he describes as a “de-
liberate representing, knowing representing, even self-conscious represent-
ing” (Dennett 2000). “Representing is florid ... when you either do, or at
any rate could, appreciate that you are manipulating objects that represent”
(Clark 2002b). It is the appreciation that words or symbols are “things about
things” (Clark 2002b) that opens up a further realm of cognitive prowess to
the florid representer. As Clark puts it,
“external symbolic objects ... allow us to unwittingly (at first)
treat a token of thought as an object for further thought. If we then
realize that that is what we did, we have stumbled into the ranks
of the florid representers—beings who are aware of the power of
using things to represent things, and can self-consciously exploit
this power in cultural practices, the delineations of explicit norms,
and so on” (Clark 2002b).
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Above all, florid representing, the awareness of the representational charac-
ter of one’s vehicled thoughts, is an enormously useful mind-tool. It is our
ability to think wittingly about thinking (Dennett 2000) that gives us the
decisive leg-up with respect to our fellow primates. As Dennett points out,
“chimpanzees never have opportunities to compare notes with
other psychologists, never get to ask for the reasons that ground
the particular attributions of mentality to others, never get to com-
municate to others or to themselves about the mental states of oth-
ers” (Dennett 2000).
We humans, on the other hand, can demand reasons for the actions and
thoughts of others and ourselves. The ability to recognize that symbols ‘stand
in’ for objects in the world allows us to manipulate these symbols with the
awareness that the fruits of our calculations are applicable to the world. We
can test out hypotheses on offline ‘model worlds’ that we can create thanks
to our florid representational skills with the anticipation that the world will
coincide with our findings. (Examples range from the idea of taking an um-
brella along in the morning because the weather forecast announced rain to
the creation of computer simulations intended to model linguistic phenom-
ena.)
Florid representing is an ability that is connected with the powerful mind-
tool of language (Clark 2002b). It gives us not only the capacity to represent,
noteworthy in its own right, but the ability to think about our representations
as representations, or as Clark says, “to acquire the idea of representation”
(Clark 2002b). It allows us to vehicle not only the input we receive from the
world, but also the outcome of contemplation that takes place ‘off-line’. It
gives us abstract concepts about things that are about things in the world.
(Think of the concept of “the injustice of the suffering of children”.) This so-
phisticated cognitive power is responsible for (as well as nourished by) “the
cultural explosion of mind-tools (notations, slide-rules, laws, norms, advice,
education) that sculpt plastic neural circuits and co-constitute human intel-
ligence” (Clark 2002b).
Once florid representing is up and running, norms multiply. As florid repre-
senters we can recognize the normativity of certain structures. Because we
possess the idea of a stand-in, we can apply an evaluative stance towards it
just as much as we can towards the slice of world for which it is standing in.
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We can determine whether thoughts are as they should be. Policing expands
from the behavioral to the cognitive domain. Pressure is not only exerted on
the way an individual behaves in society, but also the way she thinks. Norma-
tive statements include not only behavioral imperatives such as “Thou shalt
not steal,” and “Thou shalt not kill,” but also doxastic ones such as “Thou
shalt not bear false witness,” and “Thou shalt not covet they neighbors wife”.
Moreover, our characters (or utility function in Ross’ terms) become objec-
tified as well, allowing us to recognize ourselves as (appearing to) have a
character and a coherent attitude towards the world. We can notice when
we are not acting in conformity with our character and are thus blocking po-
tential social contracts from being made. Thus, we can pressurize ourselves
to conform to retain the crucial sense of identity which allows us to function
in social settings. (Having an ‘identity-crisis’ is not considered desirable and
people who feel they are undergoing one usually try to ‘find back to the beaten
track’).
We also become so sensitive to norms that explicit imperatives become nigh
superfluous. The overt “Don’t eat with your hands,” may be substituted with,
“Here we don’t eat with our hands,” or the even more covert “Here we like eat-
ing with fork and knife”. Such shrouded comments often suffice to bring an
individual in line with the reigning norm. This also applies to personal level
coherence. A simple “what’s wrong with you today” or a raising of the eyebrow
is often enough for someone to reassess her behavior and attempt to make it
more conform with her ‘real self ’. Implicature, as Paul Grice has shown, is a
fundamental aspect of language, that regulates the way language-users wield
illocutionary force over one another (Grice 1975). In their normative suscep-
tibility, individuals will eagerly comply with the most subtle exhortations,
lest they transgress against their underlying tendency towards conformity.
Furthermore, clear punishment for infractions upon norms also becomes un-
necessary. Often a disapproving look or a roll of the eyes will do to freeze
a norm-offender in her tracks and cause her to reassess her opinions and
thoughts. In our society we have become so perceptive of norms that the re-
wards and penalties of social interactions need no longer be meted out in ac-
cess to food or mates, but can be administered in ritualized gestures, prosodic
variations and subtle body language to even young members of the society.
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Moreover, we are so protective of norms that we have created a range of in-
stitutions that deal exclusively with the propagation of norms. In most coun-
tries parents are legally obliged to send their children to school at the age of
around six. In school, children are explicitly instructed in the endorsement
of behavioral, evaluative and cognitive norms. We praise children who are
particularly quick in the apprehension of norms. Children who master the
concept of multiplication when they are six are a source of pride.
Museums and theatres inform us of the artistic norms, the art we ought to
consider great. Popular culture bombards us with cultural norms and we
do our best to comply. Universities too are rearing generation after gener-
ation of compliant norm-carrier, securing that the normative transmission
does not falter. The greatest norm-provider however might be religion, with
its awe-inspiring sculpting-power over the cognitive domain of our social plas-
tic species. A society in which the normative order is this well established is
indeed ‘norm-hungry’ as John Haugeland suggests (see Chapter 7).
What we see in all these situations is representations being recursively formed
about representations. Put differently, the possibility of normative considera-
tions concerning norms arises. For instance, “You should believe in religion,”
where religion is in itself a highly complex normative structure. This can
of course be topped by, “You should tell people to believe in religion”. The
point is that once normative commitments become subject to the conforming
pressure of the social arrangement, potentially ever higher-order norms can
emerge to police the adherence to lower-order norms.3
3Dennett suggests that while few people genuinely believe in god, many people believe in
belief (Dennett 2006). In other words, while they may not actually be able to bring them-
selves to believe in an omniscient, omnipotent prime-mover, they do think that believing in
such a deity is a good thing and consequently can motivate themselves to profess to believe
in god.
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6.3 Objections
It seems that somewhere in between the illustration of Ross’ model of the self
(Chapter 5) and the account of how language intensifies the pressure on indi-
viduals to endorse norms, I have slipped from using the concept of consistency
to using that of conformity. Employing these two notions interchangeably is
problematic. The biological person is under social pressure to behave as a
consistent self (Chapter 5.3). She is also under pressure to conform to the
norms imposed by her social environment (Chapter 6). I have not explained
how these two phenomena are related and it is important that I attempt to
rectify this oversight.
On the face of it, of course, both pressures are in aid of producing a self that
is a successful negotiator of social situations. But I believe the similarities
run deeper. Creating a stable self (through the normative pressure towards
internal consistency) also provides the basis of a societal norm. People should
not be erratic or unpredictable entities. (Consider how the attribute of ‘mood-
iness’ is valued in contradistinction to that of ‘having integrity’.)
On the other hand, complying with social norms, i.e. being a conformity-
endorsing member of society, also assists in the stabilization of the self, as
this narrows down the possible ‘life-paths’ an individual can traverse. If one
conforms to prevailing norms in one’s environment, one cannot but become
similar to one’s fellow society members. If one’s fellow society members are
stable selves, then, by being like them, one too will become a stable self.
Given that they are under pressure to be consistent, the norms that are en-
dorsed socially will be ones that enable internal consistence.
Social norms are ‘clustered’ in such a way, that in obeying them, a person does
not conform to arbitrary norms, but, in virtue of her conformity, emerges as a
coherent individual. One does not adopt single, unrelated norms, but rather
‘norm-packages’, which are conducive to creating what will be considered a
coherent person. For example, being a politician will mean an individual is
concerned with public opinion and with being an eloquent speaker. These are
not only the prevailing norms in her environment, but they are also a set of
norms that, if obeyed, will induce the person to feel and act as a stable self.
The point here is that even the notion of what constitutes a stable self is nor-
mative. Certainly, one component of being a stable self is cohesion with past
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behavior (Chapter 5.3). But this cohesion is mediated by the socio-normative
conception of which types of character traits are compatible.
The attribute of ‘tolerance’ for instance is an abstracted interpretation of sim-
ilarity between single unconnected acts. A person may have acted benev-
olently towards someone of a different nationality at a certain point and
thereby gained the stamp of ‘being tolerant’, may even have considered her-
self tolerant. Being deemed tolerant, she is now under pressure to extend
similar benevolence to someone of the opposite sex, or of a different socio-
economic group. But this second act of benevolence is not directly consistent
with the first act, because being kind to a French person and being kind to a
man are not two instances of the same behavior. Rather this appears to be
consistent behavior only because it is mediated through the filter of abstract
social perception.
Although the notion of internal consistency and social conformity are deeply
intertwined, they are still not the same phenomenon. Yet the two phenom-
ena are so interdependent that attempting to separate the effect of one from
that of the other might be more detrimental to their explanatory value than
treating them as a single complex factor.
It remains to point out that the avenues of pressurizing that I have outlined
are by no means exhaustive. I am particularly intrigued by the role of emo-
tions and affective states in this process. While I do think that the account
presented here holds with the currencies of pressurization being ‘merely’
sophisticated and socially adapted tokens of evolutionary punishment and
reward—whatever counts as desirable and undesirable in the given cultural
setting—I do not think that this is the full picture. Much of the motivation
for complying with norms comes from wanting to feel (or not wanting to feel)
a certain way. The elation of finishing the Marathon enforces the norm of
training hard to obtain your goal. The sadness of seeing the suffering of oth-
ers causes people to donate to charity.
Being the sort of species that is prone to having affective states also makes us
the sort of species that is susceptible to norms and the enforcement of norms.
Humans are unique in the extent to which they can empathize with their
fellow humans. This susceptibility can be thought of as an amplifier of the
pressure exerted on our thoughts. Being left out, not fitting in, is emotionally
distressing. By conforming we can (usually) avoid this pain. This provides
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an incentive for conformity that is consciously tangible and can thus initiate
behavior of a very powerful kind.
It is posssible that such a susceptibility to affective states co-evolved with a
sensitivity for norms under the pressure towards a stable self. The relation-
ship between emotions and norms goes both ways, as norms can also define
which emotion is appropriate in a given situation. When conveying social
norms to children, for example, we often do so by appealing to their emotions.
“How would you feel if your sister had a toy car and you didn’t?”
“I don’t know,” the child might think, “I do have one. How would I feel?”
“Sad, that’s how.”
“Oh no,” thinks the child, “I better share this toy with my stupid sister”.
CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
The story (and at this point it is not much more than that) that I have pre-
sented here suggests that the combination of social coordination and (con-
siderable) cognitive plasticity gives rise to pressure on a biological person to
present a stable self to the world. This is essential in order to enter into
social contracts with other members of one’s social group. This pressure to-
wards consistency fuels the parceling of the natural order into digital pack-
ages, which provide the building blocks for coherent self-narratives. These
building blocks are norms. Norms provide the fixpoints to which agents can
gravitate, both in the narration of their self and in the coordination between
social creatures. The arrival of language, the (thus far) ultimate example of
plasticity, has resulted in an immense acceleration of the normative process,
as the practice of pressurizing can be upgraded from targeting the behavioral
to targeting the cognitive domain.
This is an account in which norms need not be basic properties of the world
but rather fall out of the adaptive strategies of sufficiently plastic creatures.
This is not necessarily a chronology favored by all philosophers. If we expand
our notion of norms to encompass natural ones, they certainly did not burst
onto the stage as this account appears to suggest. Millikan has a norma-
tive teleofunctional theory of content that requires nothing along the lines of
agents or societies, and if it is correct, means that natural selection is itself a
prolific (natural)-norm-generator (Millikan 1989b).
But even if we rule out natural norms, there is still controversy over the ori-
gins of social norms. To a certain extent, John Haugeland’s evolutionary story
of normativity overlaps a great deal with what I have outlined in this thesis.
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Both accounts agree that “once any population got sufficiently on board the
normative bandwagon” (Haugeland 2002) norms may be subject to their own
selective pressure. We also agree on the impact of norms in a social situation,
“A signal advantage of conformism-enforced norms is that the
structures of a community can rely on the fact that almost all its
members will abide by almost all the norms almost all of the time”
(Haugeland 2002).
Where we disagree however, and it is a crucial respect, is what provides the
most fundamental level from which this social run-away process emerged.
While I have argued that the proliferation of norms is an effect as opposed to a
cause of the linguistic sculpting of our cognitive space, Haugeland sees a cer-
tain ‘norm-sensitivity’ or ‘norm-hungriness’, unique to our species, as prior to
the development of our impressive linguistic and cognitive abilities. Without
this sensitivity, Haugeland theorizes, we could not have acquired language.
What the chimpanzee lacks (and the absence of which forecloses it the path
to higher cognitive faculties) is what Clark (2002c) has termed “normivorous-
ness”. “[S]ocial normativity ... more than anything, is what distinguishes
people from all the other animals” (Haugeland 2002). In accordance with
Clark, I share the conviction that it was the emergence of language that al-
lowed us the essential “objectification” of “complex features and relations”,
which “ma[de] available new, quasi-perceptual, spaces for reasoning” (Clark
2002c). And that it was this phenomenon which critically cranked up the
level at which pressure was exerted on social agents, consequently leading to
said run-away process of (cultural) social norms.
Naturally Haugeland is loathe to admit that chimpanzee groups possess any
normative structure, for this is the unique preserve of humans (Haugeland
2002).
“Such normalizing is a pervasive and basic feature of humankind—
with only the faintest antecedent in any other surviving species—
and it has enormous survival value” (Haugeland 2002, p. 31).
But I think this actually hampers his theory, for if it is true, it makes it
difficult to explain how humans have come about their sensitivity to norms.
If chimpanzees, our closest living relatives, don’t possess norms, then this
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norm-susceptibility must have arisen phylogentically after our split with our
common ancestor. Haugeland posits this ability, to which he ascribes neu-
rological actuality, as a pre-requisite for intelligent behavior and language.
“The native wetware endowment of homo sapiens has to have evolved so as
to support our norm-susceptibility and norm-hungriness” (Haugeland 2002,
p. 31). But I find it unlikely that there was evolutionary pressure that
selected for norm-sensitivity, in apes that already possessed such problem-
solving abilities as exhibited by the Köhler apes. These abilities were already
in place in a de facto normless species, while norm-susceptibility had to evolve
‘from scratch’ in order to bestow the “enormous survival value” upon us, with
which it doubtlessly provides us today. This is not to say, of course, that
an adaptationist story cannot be told about non-linguistic norm-sensitivity—
merely that I don’t find it the intuitively most plausible one.
While the account presented here nonchalantly ignores how language itself
may have arisen, Haugeland presents an interesting theoretical description
of the emergence of language in a norm-saturated world. He suggests that
norms exert a certain normative gravity’ in the world, thus ‘clumping’ social
order into tight and unevenly distributed accumulations. This paves the road
to digitalness, which in turn seems to be an essential prerequisite for the
emergence of language. “[S]ocial norms may have laid the groundwork for
language in a more basic way ... by enabling the digitalization of behavioral
types” (Haugeland 2002).
The importance of pointing out these differences is because it throws open
fundamental (and intractable) questions about the status of humans as ra-
tional agents in a biological realm. Haugeland sees norms and normative
justification as essentially divorced from evolutionary pressure. He acknowl-
edges evolution as the bedrock for norms in the same way as one acknowl-
edges “carbon [as] the bedrock” of the physical world (Clapin 2002, p. 45):
there is a sense in which it provides the basis, yet “[i]t isn’t going to be the
measure of truth”.
For Haugeland, retaining the uniquely human appreciation of ‘objective truth’
is very important and provides an incentive for explicitly building it into any
account of normativity as a necessary component. Haugeland’s approach
tackles these fundamental philosophical issues much more metaphysically
head on than anything I have outlined in this thesis. In this thesis, any sen-
sitivity towards an ‘objective truth’ falls out of the account, if not by accident,
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then certainly as a contingent feature. Haugeland cannot accept this, for it
denies us the very thing that makes us human: a neurologically real acuity
for normativity.
Haugeland posits a fundamental “faith” in or “commitment” to the norma-
tivity of our world as the crucial cognitive ability which spurs us to seek
out objective truth, and enables the development of ever more sophisticated
mechanisms of enquiry. I have addressed this faculty only in passing, well
aware that it provides the really difficult problem for any account that seeks
to naturalize intentional phenomena. To fashion a theory that is both evo-
lutionarily probable and can uphold a framework of rational dialectic seems
nearly impossible. Unpalatable steps or ad hoc assumptions are often intro-
duced in order to reconcile conflicting findings.1
While Haugeland’s account is sympathetic to a rich pallet of metaphysical
tools crucial for the intellectual enquiries we conduct today, the account de-
tailed in this thesis attempts to outline an evolutionarily sound trajectory
from social grouping and plasticity to the massive proliferation of (largely
language-based) norms. The idea is that our sensitivity to norms need not be
built into our innate machinery, but rather falls out of the run-away process
that is set into motion once we overcome the critical threshold of second-order
cognitive dynamics. With florid representing taking the sculpting of the men-
tal space one meta-level higher, perhaps we should not be too suspicious that
such ideas as truth and objectivity might materialize.
1Of course there have been some very promising attempts at naturalization made by
philosophers such as Millikan, Dennett and Fred Dretske, though none entirely without
problems.
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